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Legal Impediments to Limited Entry
Fishing Regulation in the Gulf States
ABSTRACT
Open access to the seas for fishing purposes, which has long been
a right in the United States, has over time caused serious depletion
of the stocks of the country's fisheries. Between those who go to sea
for their livelihood and ever-increasing numbers of sport fishermen,
the strain on Gulf Coast stocks has steadily worsened. Attempts to
preserve fisheries through area closings, gear restrictions, and
seasonal limitations have had little effect in reversing declining
stocks.
This article will deal with "limited entry," the most recent and
what may prove to be the most effective way of dealing with fishery
management. Limited entry is a general term used for any fishery
management program that restricts a fisherman's access to open
fisheries or limits the catch he is allowed to retain. Despite the
efficiency that limited entry is intended to promote, there is great
politicalopposition,particularlyamong commercialfishermen, to any
implementation of such a scheme. This article will discuss some of
the legal impediments to limited entry legislation in the Gulf states.
The purpose of this work is to serve as a general reference guide for
anyone interested in limited entry and how it affects the fisheries of
the Gulf states. The limited entry system in Alaska will also be
discussed since it is the most comprehensive program in the nation
and ont that has withstood numerous legal challenges.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over time, the traditionally open access to the seas for fishing
purposes has caused serious depletion of the stocks of the United States'
fisheries.' Between those who go to sea for their livelihood and everincreasing numbers of sport fishermen, the strain on Gulf Coast stocks
has steadily worsened. Attempts to preserve fisheries through area
closings, gear restrictions, and seasonal limitations have had little effect
in reversing declining stocks.
This article will discuss "limited entry," the most recent and what
may prove to be the most effective way of dealing with fishery management. Limited entry is a general term used for any fishery management
program that restricts a fisherman's access to open fisheries, or alternatively limits the catch he is allowed to retain.2 Despite the efficiency that
limited entry is intended to promote, there is great political opposition,
particularly among commercial fishermen, to any implementation of such
a scheme. The following discussion will address some of the legal
impediments to limited entry legislation in the Gulf states. Its purpose is
to serve as a general reference guide to anyone interested in limited entry
and how it affects the fisheries of the Gulf states. The limited entry
system in Alaska will also be highlighted, since it is the most comprehensive program in the nation and has withstood numerous legal challenges.
II. OVERVIEW OF LIMITED ENTRY
The responsibilities for fisheries management in the United States
are shared by the federal government and the states. The Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) regulates fisheries
in federal waters.3 The provisions of the FCMA, however, only cover
waters more than three miles off the coast, while waters within three
miles of the coast (nine miles in Florida and Texas) are governed by the
individual states.' The scope of this article will be confined to the state
waters of the Gulf Coast states.
Most traditional methods of fishery conservation have been
implemented for the purpose of maintaining the "maximum sustainable
yield" (MSY). The MSY is the supposed amount of stock that can be

1. Pearse, From Open Access to Private Property: Recent Innovations in Fishing Rights
as Instruments of Fishery Policy, 23 Ocean Development and International Law 71, 72

(1992).
2. R. Rettig & J.Ginter, Eds., Limited Entry as a Fishery Management Tool 5-6 (University
of Washington Press 1978).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1801-18 (1988 & Sup. 111990 & Sup. I1 1991).
4. Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (1988).
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taken from a fishery in a season while still allowing a full harvest to be
available in future years.' It would be easy to assume the more plentiful
the stock, the more bountiful the harvest. However, with more and more
people turning to the sea for livelihood and recreation, there has been a
growing demand on fishery resources and a corresponding decrease in
the ocean's bounty.6 Limited entry programs are designed to foster the
economic health of the fishing industry by reducing the number of
fishermen who are competing to catch fewer and fewer fish, , while at
the same time ensuring that stocks will be able to replenish themselves.8
The economic efficiencies that limited entry is designed to achieve are 1)
to minimize costs of taking the allowable annual harvest; 2) to provide
a significant net surplus of fish value over costs of the harvest; and 3) to
provide the means to fund public fishery management activity.'
A limited entry scheme may be effected either by limited
licensing or by individual tradable quotas.10 Limited licensing consists
of issuing licenses to the maximum number of people who can fish the
waters without depleting the fishery." A system of individual tradable
quotas (ITQs) allocates shares of the available stock in the fishery to
fishermen who are then allowed to catch up to the portion of fish in
which they have rights."2 Other forms of limited entry that have been
proposed include taxing the catch, granting property rights in uncaught
fish, or allocating fish only to public
enterprises, however, none of these
13
has ever been put into practice.
Limited entry entails restricting the amount of fishing that may
be done in ocean waters-areas where all citizens traditionally have had
a common right to access for purposes such as navigation, commerce, and
fishing. 4 Consequently, it is subject to challenge on constitutional
grounds in both state and federal courts. Such attacks involve claims of
denial of equal protection, due process of law, or just compensation."5
5. Pearse, supra note 2, at 73-74.
6. R. Groseclose & G. Boone, An Examination of Limited Entry as a Method of Allocating
Commercial Fishery Rights, 6 UCLA-Alaska L. Rev. 201, 202 (1977).
7. D. Huppert, Economies of Fishery Limited Access, Sixth Annual National Fishery Law
Symposium 235 (Sept. 1988).
8. Pearse, supra note 2, at 73-76.
9. Huppert, supra note 8, at 235.
10. Id. at 236-39.
11. Id. at 236.
12. Id. at 237.
13. E. Greenburg, Legal Aspects of Limited Entry Schemes Under the Magnuson Act,
Sixth Annual National Fishery Symposium, 247, 250 (Sept. 1988).
14. Martin v. Waddell, 41 US (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
15. Sax, Legal Dimensions of Entry Fishery Management, 17 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 757,
758-59 (1976).
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In addition to constitutional obstacles, a state seeking to impose a
program of limited entry must also comply with its own statutory policy
and the objectives of its state fishery management program. Any limited
entry system must be consistent with these provisions to withstand legal
challenge.
III. METHODS OF EFFECTING LIMITED ENTRY
A.

Limited Licensing

License limitation restricts the number of vessels, fishermen, gear,
areas, or any combination thereof that are allowed to participate in
fishing operations. 6 Because of problems with other methods of
controlling entry, license limitation has emerged as a favored method of
limited entry. 7 The manner of selecting which fishermen, vessels, or
gear qualify for these licenses ranges from a simple lottery to a moratorium (capping the total amount allowed in a fishery at the existing level) 8
to selections based on an individual's fishing history, his dependence on
the fishery, and his past performance in that fishery.' However, the
system a state decides to use should be chosen carefully. If a court finds
that a definable group has been excluded from a fair opportunity to
receive a license, it may strike down the program as violative of equal
protection. 2°
Transferability of licenses also poses legal difficulties. If the state
makes licenses freely transferable, the risk arises that most of the licenses
will eventually be gathered into the hands of a few, possibly creating
monopoly and antitrust problems.2' On the other hand, free transferability allows the value of licenses to fluctuate according to their market
price, thus allowing fishermen to make an economically profitable
decision to leave the fishery.' Along with the ability to use the license
as a security interest for loans and the possible creation of a property
right, the development of a satisfactory license transferability scheme is
one of the most difficult aspects of devising a valid limited entry
program.
Another significant problem that has arisen in the limited
licensing system is the possible inefficiency of the program. Limited

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Huppert, supra note 8, at 236.
Groseclose, supra note 7, at 207.
Sax, supra note 15, at 772.
Huppert, supra note 8, at 235.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Sax, supra note 15, at 772.
Huppert, supra note 8, at 236.
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licensing seeks to control exploitation of the fishery by restricting the
amount of vessels, fishermen, or gear admitted to a given fishery. 23 The
theory is quite simple: the fewer the fishermen, the fewer the fish taken,
which promotes the economic efficiency of the vessel and ensures the
conservation of the stock.24 It has been argued, however, that license
limitation is an inadequate means of limiting the number of fishermen in
a fishery and that it will not prevent overcapitalization,'3 since the
remaining fishermen will attempt to make their vessels capable of
handling the surplus stock, thereby defeating the conservational goals of
limited entry.'
B. Individual Tradable Quotas
Individual tradable quotas come in two forms. They can be
expressed either as shares or percentages of an annually determined
"total allowable catch" (TAC), or as a fixed yearly catch.' As with
license limitation, the primary challenge will likely be directed against the
method by which shares are distributed. Since a fisherman's individual
shares under this scheme are transferable, the market price of such shares
will rise and fall depending on the value of the stock. Fleets can therefore
make a reasonably prudent decision about how much stock they can
afford to catch in a season.' The temptation to overcapitalize is taken
away under ITQ management because of the scarcity value of additional
catch in the ITQs price; hence fishermen will work towards keeping
down the cost of harvesting rather than catching as much as possible as
quickly as possible.' In addition, ITQs advance conservation goals if the
aggregate of ITQs outstanding is monitored yearly and reflected in
annual revisions of the total annual catch; the resulting quotas would
accurately reflect the change needed to preserve fishery stocks.'
However, individual tradable quotas have their share of problems.
An obvious problem with ITQs is enforcement: a state regulatory
agency may have to spend immense sums of money to ensure that
fishermen are not taking more than their share. Another problem with
ITQ programs is, in a sense, inherent in their intended purpose, which is

23. Groseclose, supra note 7,at 207.
24. Sax, supra note 15, at 768.
25. Huppert, supra note 8, at 237. .
26. Id. at 3. Fishermen may alter their boat's capacity to handle the extra fish due to the
fewer vessels in the area.
27. Id.
28. Groseclose, supra note 7, at 206.
29. Huppert, supra note 8, at 238.
30. Id.
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to have the most economically efficient fishing fleet while still preserving
fishery stocks. Due to the transferability of shares, the quota system
might tend to create a fishery dominated by large fishing concerns.31
Although promoting economic efficiency of fisheries is one of the
objectives of limited entry, many smaller fishermen fear losing access to
the fishery to large fishing entities and are adamantly opposed to any
ITQ scheme. While a state may limit the number of shares owned by any
one entity, such a solution limits a feature of ITQs, which makes the
system appealing.
Most troubling is the prospect that the ITQ system could
encourage wanton discard of fish because quotas would be monitored
only by inspecting the catch on board at a vessel's landing. Because
vessels would be limited as to the number of fish they could land, they
might embark on a course of "high grading" their catch retaining only
the largest fish and. discarding the rest.' Assigning a weight limit,
rather than a numerical limit, to the fisherman's expressed proportion of
the catch would seem to alleviate this problem, but this method is as yet
untested.
C. Taxation
At first glance, taxation or other economic disincentives, either
alone or in combination with one of the previously mentioned programs,
might seem to provide the most efficient limited entry scheme. Taxation
may be considered outside the ambit of limited entry, but experts have
cited tax policy as a possible limitation system under the theory that as
taxes increase for landed catch, the less profitable fishermen will be
forced to leave the fishery.' Opposition to new taxes of any kind
precludes any real chance of seeing such an attempt s
IV. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A.

Limited Entry in General

State governments have power to enact legislation to protect
natural resources that belong to the public.' A state can enforce a total

31. Groseclose, supra note 7, at 207.
32. Id.
33. Huppert, supra note 8,at 238-39.
34. Supra note 16, at 775.
35. Groseclose, supra note 7, at 206. Taxation would create an economic squeeze that
would be inequitable and politically unpopular, Id.
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1851 et. seq. (1988 and Supp. I1 1991).
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prohibition on using certain resources in order to protect those resources
from depletion or destruction. 3' However, the power to ban the use of
a natural resource does not always carry with it the power merely to
limit or restrict the use of a resource. While a total prohibition has an
equal effect on all who wish to use the resource, limitation carries with
it the potential for unequal treatment.
Any resulting disparity in
treatment is likely to be the argument of those who oppose limited entry.
An equal protection claim is the most obvious claim that could
be brought against a limited entry scheme. Such a claim would likely
assert that the manner used to determine who should have access to a
fishery unreasonably discriminated against certain classes of fishermen."
Under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, a licensing classification will be upheld so
long as the legislative classification bears a rational relationship to a
legitimate state purpose or interest.'" This standard is relatively low. To
survive equal protection scrutiny, the state would only have to show that
its method of allocating entry into fisheries was legitimately designed to
achieve the goals of limited entry. The system the state employs need
only be legitimately designed to effect its purpose, not necessarily the
most equitable or most efficient 'one. This standard will not support a
suspect classification4 nor one that affects a fundamental interest (i.e.,
an interest the denial of which would violate a right guaranteed by the
Constitution).42 Any such classification demands the highest scrutiny,
and the state has the burden of proving the classification is compelling
and not merely related to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy.'

37. Endanged Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-44 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 41-47 (1988).
38. Supra note 16, at 762-63.
39. Id. at 763.
40. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); see City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (holding that withstanding equal protection
challenge requires that state legislation be rationally related to legitimate state interest);
County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 7, (1977) (holding that equal protection clause requires
simply that distinction drawn by ordinance must rationally promote objectives of
regulation).
41. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (the standard to support a suspect
classification is that the rule must be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective). See generally Black's Law Dictionary, 1297 (5th ed. 1979) (defining suspect
classification as those which are based on race, alienage, national origin and sex).
42. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that a governmental
purpose constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by unnecessarily
broad and sweeping legislation); see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)
(holding that a law invading fundamental a right will be upheld only if it is necessary and
not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy).
43. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (holding that mandate of equal protection
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Though the choice of one's career is an important concern, no
court has held it to be a fundamental right like marriage, 4 voting, s
procreation,* or interstate travel,47 all of which have been accorded
higher standards of judicial scrutiny.' The Supreme Court, has shown
a desire to affirm states' legislative evaluations of the public's economic
and social welfare in its decisions involving economic regulation or
resource management.' Since limited entry is a legitimate way of
achieving economic efficiency in fisheries and preserving the natural
resources of a state, any equal protection claim would likely be unavailing so long as access classifications are rationally related to the program's
stated purpose.
A second constitutional claim that could be brought against a
limited entry scheme is one of due process.' There are two facets of due
process, one substantive and the other procedural. Courts review
substantive due process claims regarding industry regulations in much
the same way as they do equal protection claims. There need only be the
same rational relationship between the regulation and its purpose.5' A
substantive due process claim would likely assert that the right to fish
(i.e., liberty) or that fish or fishing gear (i.e., property) had been taken
without due process of law.' It is, therefore, unlikely that a substantive
due process claim would succeed in invalidating a limited entry scheme.

requires showing that a legislative classification must be "precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest").
44. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (stating marriage is a basic civil right necessary for our very
existence).
45. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that the right to
vote is fundamental and any restraint on that right must be closely scrutinized and carefully
continued).
46. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that the proposed sterilization
of criminals is dealing with one of basic civil rights of man, procreation).
47. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (holding that when a classification
infringes on fundamental right such as interstate travel, its constitutionality must be judged
by stricter standard).
48. Sax, supra 15, at 764.
49. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 4&3,488-89 (1955) (stating that in order to protect
themselves from abuses by legislatures, citizens must turn to polls, not to courts).
50. U.S. Const amend. XIV § 1. The due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
states "... . nor shall any state deprive any person of live, liberty, or property, without due
process of law;... "Id. While the phrase "due process of law" does not lend itself precisely
to a comprehensive definition of "substantive rights," it has been characterized as a right
to contest the propriety of each step in an action taken to deprive a citizen of his "private
rights." 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 945 (1985).
51. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488 (states it is enough that a particular legislative action is
a rational way to correct a perceived evil).
52. Sax, supra note 15, at 763.
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Procedural due process requires a state to administer sufficient
procedures to ensure that entry rights are distributed and rescinded
fairly. These procedures include giving notice of the state's revocation of
a right and affording a hearing appropriate to the case upon revocation.' Responsible implementation of a limited entry program should
fulfill the requirements of procedural due process (notice, right to
hearing, and right to review), decreasing' the likelihood of a successful
due process claim.
Courts have already addressed due process claims regarding the
validity of fishing regulations. In Corsa v. Tawes,5 fishermen challenged
a Maryland statute that forbade the use of purse nets in state tidal waters.
Net fishing was the only economically feasible way to catch menhaden.
Maryland justified the regulation by asserting that it was necessary for
the conservation of menhaden and the protection of sport fishing.'
Though the ultimate effect of the legislation was to eliminate the
Maryland commercial menhaden industry, the district court held that
since the state had a legitimate objective and that the means to reach that
objective were reasonable the due process clause required no more.'
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision of the district
court.5 7
The final potential Constitutional claim against limited entry is
one of a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment. The fifth amendment to
the United States Constitution requires the government to pay just'
compensation for any property or property right it takes from a private
citizen. ' For any taking claim to be successful, the plaintiff must have a
cognizable property interest in the subject of the taking.' Fishermen do
not have title to wild fish until they are reduced to possession by
capture.' The licenses and permits, required for fishing in every state,
53. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,542 (1970). In rare and extraordinary situations, protected
interests may be revoked without some kind of prior hearing. Id.; see Ewing v. Mytinger &
Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594,598-99 (1950) (consumer goods believed to be dangerous to public
health may be seized without prior hearing); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S.
554, 566 (1921) (holding that in times of war Congress has power to provide for immediate
seizure of property believed to be owned by the enemy).
54. 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1957).
55. Corsa, 149 F. Supp. at 776.
56. Corsa, 149 F. Supp. at 775-76.
57. Affd 355 U.S. 37 (1957).
58. U.S. Const. amend V (stating that ... "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation); see DeSalvo v. Arkansas La. Gas Co., 239 F. Supp. 312,316
(E.D. Ark. 1965) (the just compensation clause of Fifth Amendment has been carried forward
into Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause so that states are prohibited from taking
property without just compensation).
59. Sax, supra note 15, at 763.
60. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 US. 69, 75 (1941) (absent conflicting federal statutes, states
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are generally considered to confer a privilege, which is revocable at the
discretion of the issuing agency.6' Even in cases where fishermen have
challenged legislation that had the effect of rendering their equipment
useless, the Supreme Court has refused to find a taking.' Because
fishermen have no cognizable property rights in fish, in the context of
limited entry, courts have ruled that rendering gear useless is not a
"taking" in the legal sense.
B. License Limitation
Traditionally, licensing Was a way for states to finance the
administration of fishing regulations.' Licenses are required in every
state in order to participate in fishing, but under a limited entry scheme,
the number of licenses granted would be limited for the purpose of
excluding people from fisheries. Besides the political obstacles that would
be encountered upon implementation of a limited licensing scheme, there
are constitutional impediments as well.
To avoid an equal protection claim, a state seeking to implement
a license limitation scheme must take care that its license distribution
scheme does not exclude a suspect class. The most feasible way to bring
an equal protection claim would be to assert that the distribution system
violates the stated purpose. For example, if the stated purpose of the
limited entry scheme is to encourage the economic well-being of the
fishing industry, one class of excluded fisherman could claim that the
limited entry scheme was not promoting their economic well-being. A
state could avoid this difficulty by carefully wording its statement of
legislative or administrative purpose, using such terms as "conservation
of fishery resources" along with "economic efficiency," so that excluded
fishermen could not claim that the limited entry scheme was not
furthering its intended purpose. The same careful wording approach in
formulating a license allocation system would likely prevent any claim

may regulate the conduct of resident fishermen even in fisheries located outside state
waters). Le Clair v. Swift, 76 F. Supp. 729, 733 (E.D. Wis, 1948) (commercial fisherman do
not have the absolute right to fish in waters controlled by states and that any property right
in fish in state waters is vested in the state, prior to being caught). See 36A C.J.S. Fish § 2
(1961) (stating that as long as fish have not yet been taken and reduced to possession they
are not subject of private property).
61. 36A C.J.S. Fish § 36 (1961) (states that the nature of the license depends on the terms
of the authorizing statute, however it is not a contract, franchise, or property right and does
not create vested or permanent rights).
62. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894) (holding that where property is of little value
and it is dearly used for illegal purposes, it may be declared a nuisance and seized without
compensation).
63. Sax, supra note 15, at 768.
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grounded in due process. All equal protection problems are avoided by
distributing licenses through a blind system such as a lottery. However,
staking a participants' livelihood and investment on pure chance would
not be a politically attractive choice."
Another method of distribution that could be used would be a
sale or auction. Sales or auctions have their own drawbacks in that they
may create a benefited class consisting only of rich fishermen. The
Supreme Court has, however, never held a wealth-based legislative
classification subject to the heightened scrutiny of equal protection.' In
other words, if a statutory system created a dichotomy in a certain
industry based solely on economic ability to participate in that industry,
it would survive equal protection scrutiny.
Any successful licensing program will have to describe the scope
of the property rights vested in the license, which goes to the heart of the
transferability problem. At one end of the scale there is no transferability
and the license would immediately revert to the state when its owner
died, left the fishing business, or was legally disqualified from holding
it. However, this system would discourage efficient fishing entities from
expanding their operations and less efficient fishing entities from
leaving.' At the other extreme is free transferability. Because the right
to fish has value, the holder of that right to fish possesses a property
right. 7 If the state chooses to allow the fisherman holding that right to
sell it, then the state must take care to provide proper due process and
just compensation if it attempts to limit the license holder's right to
fish.' A free transferability scheme could also create monopoly and
anti-trust problems for license-holders, as well as raising the specter of
the previously mentioned rich/poor classifications.'
To achieve the goals of limited entry and to avoid the potential
legal entanglements of vested property rights, any transferability scheme
will need to incorporate the positive aspects of both approaches. Some
suggestions for this approach have been to make any transfer subject to
the approval of the state's management agency and to require that any

64. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312,390 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (discussing the
use of open drawings by any licensed purse seiner to distribute licenses). See Sax, note 15
at 772 (a blind allocation system, such as lottery, would treat potential applicants equally).
65. Kadrmas v., Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1987) (courts have rejected
the proposition that statutes which discriminate on basis of wealth will not be subject to
heightened scrutiny).
66. Huppert, supra note 8, at 2.
67. Sax, supra note 16, at 767.
68. Bell, 402 U.S. at 542.
69. Sax, supranote 16, at 772 (discussing possibility that licenses could devolve into hands
of rich few which may create monopoly).
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transfer of the license be made to or by the state's management agency. 70
Limiting the number of licenses one entity could own and allowing only
natural persons, not corporations or organizations, to own licenses have
also been suggested.7' However, the stated purpose of the limited entry
program2 must be rationally achieved regardless of the method that is
chosen.
Closely related to transferability are the legal problems associated
with the disposition of an interest in a fishery upon the death of a
license-holder and the use of an interest in a fishery as a security interest.
Though individual state inheritance laws would mandate how a license
would descend (if indeed a license was subject to inheritance laws), the
inheritance of a license would benefit the purpose of economic efficiency
if the receiving heir was in the fishing industry. Conversely, if the
receiving heir was not in the fishing industry, then this would hamper
efficiency. A state could devise a system that required any receiving heir
to meet the same eligibility requirements all license holders must meet in
order to inherit the license without any constitutional repercussions. It
would only have to pass the rational basis test.7' Others have suggested
a better system would be to have the state automatically buy back all
licenses upon death.'4
As a general rule, licenses should not be available for security
interest on loans. One school of thought maintains that using the license
as a security interest may increase capital investments in the fisheries.'
However, because a security interest can be defined as an interest in
personal property, allowing a license to be used as security would give
fishermen an argument that a license created a property interest in
uncaught fish.'
C. Individual Tradable Quotas
In theory, ITQs are supposed to foster economic growth and
efficiency of a fishery in much the same manner the stock market

70. Id.
71.Groseclose, supra note 7, at 207 (discussing methods of preventing quota system from
being as tool by which large and efficient fisherman might dominate fishery).
72. City of New Orleans, 427 U.S. at 303 (stating that unless classification infringes on
fundamental right or upon suspect distinctions, constitutionality of statute is assumed).
73. Id. (stating that statute must bear rational relation to legitimate state interest).
74. Sax, supra note 16, at 772.
75. Huppert, supra note 8, at 2.
76. U.C.C. § 1-201(37)(1992) (defining security interest as interest in personal property
which secures payment or performance of obligation). See 79 C.J.S. Supp. Secured Transaction
§§ 6, 11 (1974) (discussing definition of "collateral" and property and rights subject to
security interest).
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promotes economic growth and efficiency in business." No one argues
that purchasing stock in a corporation creates a property interest in the
company for the holder of the stock.' Logic would say the same rule
should apply to ITQs.
At the outset, the equal protection issue should be addressed. The
same problems that might arise in the license limitation area are present
in ITQs as well.' By taking the precautions mentioned in regard to
license limitation, most equal protection claims on ITQs should be
avoided.
Property law has traditionally held that individuals have no right
in fish while free.' Thus, fishermen have no right in fish until they are
caught."' But if a state were to award a fisherman a fixed percentage of
the TAC, this would seem to give the fisherman a property interest in the
fish before they were caught. In theory this might seem attractive to the
state. It would encourage the economic efficiency that a limited entry
program seeks to achieve, and would also promote private enforcement
of fishing regulations.'
Creating a private property interest in the fish could also help
reduce water pollution. Typically, states and the federal government have
the only causes of action against polluters, with their remedies having
little deterrent value. If a property interest should be created, all
fishermen holding an ITQ would have an independent cause of action
against the polluter, with an almost certain prospect of an award of
damages. The threat of numerous expensive lawsuits would have a far
greater deterrent value than any cause of action held by the state or the
federal government.'
Nonetheless, the costs of creating a property interest weigh much
heavier than any benefits that might accrue. Though recognizing a
property interest in the fish might encourage private enforcement of
fishing regulation, the state would then be required to respect this
property interest. This means that subsequent changes in the law which

77. Huppert, supra note 8, at 4.
78. 18 CJS. Corporations § 123(b) (1990) (capital stock "exists only nominally" and is
mere representation of actual property or assets of corporation).
75. Sax, supra note 16, at 773-74.
80. Pearse, supra note 1, at 72 (discussing tradition of unrestricted right to fish and its
origin in ancient doctrine of freedom of seas).
81. LeClair, 76 F. Supp. at 733 (stating that fishermen do not have right in fish until they
are reduced to possession).
82. Sax, supra note 16, at 774.
83. Id. (states may sue polluters, however measuring damages is a complex problem.
While fishing industries can demonstrate direct and quantifiable damages, a state would
have little in the way of measurable damages).
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deprive a fisherman of his portion of the TAC would give rise to a valid
due process and "takings" claim."
V. LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS ON THE STATE LEVEL
A brief discussion of the events surrounding the enactment of
Alaska's limited entry system, the nation's first, offers insights into
how a comprehensive limited entry program might be greeted in the
Gulf states. While most of the Gulf states have implemented some
form of limited entry, there has been to date no judicial challenge to
limited entry on the Gulf. Alaska's experience, therefore, may provide
an illustrative model of the legal challenges that could be raised upon
the enactment of a limited entry program along the Gulf Coast.
A.

Legal Impediments to Limited Entry in Alaska

Upon its second attemptrs at inaugurating a limited entry
program, Alaska succeeded in establishing a license limitation system for
salmon fisheries.' The Alaska program allows licenses to be issued
only to individuals, not to business entities.' The state grants two types
of permits, interim and permanent, both of which are issued for a defined
area and for the amount of participation desired by the license-holder.
Permanent licenses are issued for those fisheries suffering from exhaustion, and distribution is based on a detailed point system (with persons
having the most points receiving licenses). ' Factors considered in the
point system are the applicant's past participation in the fishery, the
degree of his economic dependency on the fishery, his access to
alternative employment, and the amount of his capital investment in
vessels and gear." Upon issuance, an entry permit is valid for one year
but is renewable annually.' The license may be transferred through the

84. Id.
85. The first attempt, which was implemented in 1968, required that anyone who wished
to apply for a limited entry license had to have fished in that area for at least one year after
1965, or any of three years after 1960. A three judge court struck down these provisions as
violative of fourteenth amendment equal protection, claiming the date restrictions bore no
rational relationship to the intended purpose of the program. Bozanich v. Reetz, 297 F. Supp.
300, 305-06 (D. Alaska 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
86. Alaska Stat. §§ 16.43.010, 16.43.390 (1992)
87. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.990 (1992) ("person" means a natural person and does not include
corporation or other business entities).
88. Telephone interview with Kurt Schelle, Manager: Research and Planning, Alaska
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (Feb. 3, 1992).
89. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.250 (1992).
90. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.150(c)-(d) (1992).
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state limited entry administration committee so long as the recipient has
a "present ability to participate actively in the fishery." 9'
Interim use permits are issued in two separate situations. The
Alaska program also provides for a buy-back fund financed through
license fees under which permits can be retired on a voluntary basis
when the state decides a reduction in the number of fishermen is
necessary to maintain stock in a fishery.' The system also allows for an
increase in the issuance of permits when the danger of over-fishing
subsides.93
The initial challenge to Alaska's system came in Isakson v.
Rickey." In formulating a limited entry program, the Alaska legislature
decided that the highest number of gear licensees who actually participated in a fishery from 1969 to 1972 would constitute the benchmark figure
for the issuance of future licenses." The legislature further decided to
grant permits only to those fishermen who planned to continue in the
fishery. The Act was passed in April 1973, however, because of administrative considerations, the legislature chose to commence the new
program in 1975. Only those persons who had been issued gear permits
prior to 1 January 1973 were allowed to apply for a permit. Consequently, fishermen who were active in a fishery before 1973, but who had
subsequently left were able to apply for a permit. However, those who
had received a permit in early 1973, and who by 1975 had become
dependent
on the fishery for their livelihood, were deprived of that
9
privilege. 7
The plaintiffs, eleven fisherman who received permits after 1
January 1973, sought a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction,
as well as a permanent injunction preventing the enforcement of the cutoff date." At trial, they argued that the cut-off date provision violated
the fourteenth amendment requirement of equal protection. Their claim
was denied and dismissed on summary judgment."
The Alaska
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the acquisition of a limited entry
permit was not a fundamental right, but based on the plaintiff's equal
protection argument, it would no longer apply the "rational basis"
standard to this type of legislation."W The court wrote that a more
91. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.170(c)-(e) (1992).
92. Alaska Stat. §§ 16.43.310, 16.43.320 (1992)
93. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.300(a) (1992)
94. Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976).
95. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.240(a) (1992)
96. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.260(a), (d), (e) (1992)
97. Isakson, 550 P.2d at 361.
98. Id.
99. Isakson v. Rickey, Civil No. 75-31 (Alaska Super. Ct., Ist Judicial Dist. 1974).
100. Isakson, 550 P,2d at 363.
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demanding standard will be applied and this court will no longer
hypothesize facts which would sustain otherwise questionable legislation. 0 ' The court's new test required there to be a fair and substantial
relationship between the objectives of legislation and the rationale for
imposing differing requirements on a particular group of individuals."°
"The rational basis test too often preordains the outcome of a case," noted
3
the court in expressing its dissatisfaction with the rational basis test.'0
The Alaska Supreme Court's decision was unclear about whether
the prior gear license holding requirement or the cut-off date was
unconstitutional. The Alaska Attorney General interpreted the decision
as only invalidating the cut-off date, and, in light of subsequent case
history, it is assumed he was correct.1c 4 The state amended the limited
entry act, with 1 January 1975 as the new cut-off date."° Over 1,300
gear licenses were obtained in 1973 and 1974. As a result of this
amendment, 400 of these licenseholders subsequently received limited
entry permits."
A challenge to the gear license requirement itself was then
brought before the Alaska Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Alaska
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Apokedak claimed that requiring
an applicant to hold a gear license before he could be considered for a
limited entry permit violated Fourteenth Amendment equal protection,
as well as Alaska's stricter standard of equal protection as announced in
0
Isakson."'
The first issue addressed was the scope of the decision in
Isakson. The court reasoned that since the plaintiffs in Isakson all had gear
licenses at the time of the suit, the effect of the decision was only to
invalidate the cut-off date provision.1' 8 The court, citing City of New
Orleans v. Duke, went on to hold that allowing only prior gear license
holders to be considered for limited entry permits was not violative of
fourteenth amendment equal protection standard. 109 Finally, the court
said that the requirement was not adverse to Alaska's equal protection
standard, stating that "even Alaska's stricter standard of equal protection
does not demand perfection in classification. If it did, then there would

101. Id. at 362.
102. State v. Wylie, 516 P2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973).
103. Id. at 361. See Owers, Court Tests of Alaska's Limited Entry Law, 11 UCLA-Alaska L.
Rev. 87,90 (1981) (granted this is higher level of equal protection than Constitution requires,
but that is prerogative of state).
104. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255 (Alaska
1980).
105. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.260(e) (1992)
106. Owers, supra note 102, at 97.
107. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 606 P.2d at 1260.
108. Id. at 1260-61.
109. Id. at 1263-64.
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be few laws establishing classifications that would sustain an equal
protection challenge.""'
The last serious challenge to Alaska's limited entry system came
in Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission."' The Alaska Supreme
Court held that the constitutionality of a limited entry program was
based on the initiation of the complete system, and any omission from
the statutory plan that had the effect of defeating its purpose as a whole
would make the entire plan void." 2 In this case, the statutory omission
was part of the limited entry program's "maximum/optimum number"
system."3 The Alaska legislature sets the "maximum number" as the
benchmark figure for the number of licenses to be issued. The "optimum
number" denotes the number of licenses that can be issued in a given
year and still meet all of limited entry's conservational and economic
objectives."' These numbers are significant because they determine
whether or not the buy-back fund will have to be used. If the optimum
number is less than the maximum number, the state must use the buyback to re-acquire licenses from fishermen until the optimum number is
reached.' The decision in Johns directed the CFEC to initiate the
determination of optimum numbers." 6 Elements of the buy-back fund
portion of the system were held unconstitutional under an Alaska
provision that prevents state commissions from holding dedicated funds
outside the legislature," 7 but this difficulty was removed by an amendment to the program. While some fishermen have brought actions to
challenge the CFEC's determination of how many points they had been
assigned to receive an entry permit, none of these suits has been
successful. "

110. Id. at 1267.
111. Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 758 P.2d 1256 (Alaska 1988).
112. Johns, 758 P.2d at 1266.
113. Telephone interview with Kurt Schelle, Research and Planning, manager. Alaska
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (Feb. 3, 1992).
114. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.290 (1992)
115. Alaska Stat. § 16.43.320(a) (1992)
116. Johns, 758 P.2d at 1266.
117. Supra, note 114.
118. Wilson v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 770 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1989)
(equal protection claims against the denial of limited entry permits failed); Arkanakyak v,
Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 759 P.2d 513 (Alaska 1988) (appeal for the
issuance of permits failed because the issues were not ripe for judicial review); Chocknok
v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 696 P.2d 669 (Alaska 1985) (for purposes
of obtaining permits, the wives of fishermen were not partners).
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B. Legal Impediments to Limited Entry in Florida
Florida has implemented a general form of limited entry."9
License limitation schemes have been implemented in various fisheries
with little or no incidental catch. A limited number of trap certificates are
now issued for spiny lobster harvests."2 The success of these programs
is uncertain at this point. 2' Nonetheless, these systems have dominated
the fishermen's and the government's discussions about future legislation
Other programs under active
to regulate commercial fisheries."
consideration in Florida include subjecting more fisheries to license
limitation, ITQs, and implementing a moratorium on the issuance of
licenses in certain fisheries.3
Florida declares its fisheries policy "to be management and
preservation of its renewable marine fishery resources, based upon the
best available information, emphasizing protection and enhancement of
the marine and estuarine environment in such a manner as to provide for
optimum sustained benefits and use to all the people of this state." '2
Though the lack of mention of economic factors would probably not
defeat a limited entry program, inserting an "economic enhancement"
phrase might avoid litigation. The phrase "optimum sustained benefits,"
which was recently changed from simply "benefits," would seem to
speak to limited entry's goal of maintaining fishery stocks for the future.
A possible problem comes from the use of the word "all" in the final
phrase of the statute. Florida may have to remove this word from the
legislation, or be prepared to prove to a court that excluding a fisherman
from fisheries is in his best interest. 125
The pertinent part of the text of Florida's equal protection clause
follows:
"All natural persons are equal before the law and have
is as
inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and
liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire,
Case history of Florida's equal
protect, and possess property.""
protection clause seems to indicate that the state legislature has greater
latitude in enacting laws that might raise equal protection concerns than

119. MS-ALA Sea Grant Program, 1992 Survey of Limited Entry Fishery Regulation (1992)
[hereinafter Survey). (on file with MS-ALA Sea Grant Program).
120. Id.
121. Id. (response from Dr. Russel Nelson).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Fla. Stat. Ann. §370.025(1) (West 1988)
125. Granted, the word "all" is most likely being used in a community sense. However,
a clearer explanation of its meaning would likely deter litigation.
126. Fla. Const. art. I § 2.
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does the federal government under the equal protection clause of the U.S.
Constitution.'27
The right of individuals to fish in the public waters of Florida is
subject to state regulation for the general welfare. This regulation may be
of any character and to any extent that does not operate to destroy that
right."2 Florida also has a legitimate interest in regulating the taking
of fish, and legislation designed to regulate the fishing industry is an
appropriate exercise of state power."2 ' With regard to shrimp, one of the
most valuable of Gulf Coast stocks, the Florida Supreme Court has stated
that "shrimping is a gainful activity which may be subjected to certain
reasonable limitations and conditions without violating any constitutional
rights of those subject to regulations." 3° The key phrase here is
"reasonable limitations." What is reasonable has yet to be decided.
Whether "reasonable limitations" would be extended by the court to a
limitation on access, or even exclusion, is an open question.
This leads to police power under the due process provision. Florida's due
process section in pertinent part is similar to the federal version: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law." 3' In matters where exercise of police power is involved, due
process does not require notice nor hearing prior to the exercise of power,
and it is enough that a method of review exists according to the rules of
practice and procedure of the courts."' This statement would seem to
alleviate any necessity for procedural due process in regulating the
fishing industry under police power. However, there might be the need
for procedure if Florida decided to implement a license limitation scheme.
Licenses essential in pursuit of livelihood may not be revoked or

127. Department of Revenue v. AMREP Corp., 358 S.2d 1343, 1349 (Fla. 1978) (holding
that in matters of taxation, states possess more latitude in creating classifications without
offending Federal Constitution); see also, Futch v. Stone, 281 So.2d 484, 485 (Fla. 1973)
(holding that broader latitude has been granted to states under the equal protection clause
in state legislative redistricting) (citing Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973)). Contra,
Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So.2d 204, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (stating
that Florida equal protection clause was intended to mesh with that of Federal Constitution),
approved, 452 So.2d 932 (Fla. 1984), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 1030 (1984).
128. Ex parte Powell, 70 So. 392, 396-97 (Fla. 1915).
129. Fulford v. Graham, 418 So.2d 1204, 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
130. State v. Hodges, 506 So.2d 437, 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 515
So.2d 229 Fla. 1987). In this case, the appellants claimed that the statute empowering the
Florida Department of Natural Resources to delineate areas available for shrimp harvesting
was vague as to its description of "shoreline" and that the regulation itself bore no rational
relationship to any state interest. Id. at 438. See also, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 370.153 (West 1988)
(statute failing to supply definition for shoreline).
131. Fla. Const. art. I § 9.
132. Larson v. Warren, 132 So.2d 177, 181 (Fla. 1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 427
(1962).
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suspended without procedural due process."
Which one of the
aforementioned positions would be adhered to if the state decided to
implement a license limitation system under its police power is another
open question.
The Florida constitution and subsequent case history adds
nothing to substantive due process that is not already required by the
federal constitution. The state supreme court has written that it is well
settled that in the exercise of its police power, the manner selected to
enforce this power shall have a reasonable and substantial relation to the
objective sought to be obtained.' This statement is little more than a
rewording of the "rational" or "substantial" basis test as required by the
U.S. Supreme Court. The question that due process raises on the state
level is whether or not under its police power Florida will have to give
process if previous license holders are excluded under a license limitation
system.
The final constitutional section that may affect the implementation of a limited entry scheme does not restrict the possibilities of
enactment but rather gives an additional means of enactment. Article 1,
section 8 and the 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution only gives
Congress the power to tax income; the states retain broad taxing powers.
An economic disincentive tax, though likely to be unpopular, may be a
method of achieving the result desired, while at the same time not
necessarily excluding anyone from the fishery. The pertinent section
reads, "Pursuant to general law, tangible personal property held for stock
in trade and livestock may be valued for taxation at a specified percentage of its value.""3 The language of this section lends itself well to a
possible limited entry scheme. Under it commercial fishermen harvesting
for trade could be taxed while leaving sport fishermen alone. The key
question here is whether or not landed fish held for sale would fall into
a court's definition of "tangible personal property held for stock in
trade." All property is subject to ad valorem taxation unless it is
constitutionally exempted.'
No constitutional exception for any type
of seafood exists. While Florida statutory or case law does not define
tangible property, intangible property is defined as all personal property
that is not in itself intrinsically valuable but derives its chief value from
that which it represents. 37 Assuming everything not intangible is
tangible, seafood fits the definition. On the question whether or not
landed fish would be considered "stock in trade," the best evidence

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Robinson v. Florida Bd. of Dentistry, 447 So.2d 930, 932 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1984).
State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1986).
Fla. Const. art. VII § 4(b) (1885)
Colding v. Herzog, 467 So.2d 980, 983 (Fla. 1985).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 199.023() (West 1988).
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comes from Art 9, §14 (a) of the 1885 Florida Constitution (the 1885
equivalent of Art. 7, §4 (b). of the 1968 version). Rather than "stock in
trade," the equivalent phrase in the 1885 version reads, "goods, wares,
commodities, and merchandise, commonly known as stock in trade.""
Though no court has specifically stated that seafood would be part of this
definition, at least one Florida supreme court decision has suggested that
seafood could be considered "stock in trade."", Since fish belongs to
the state until caught, when it becomes personal property, there are only
two limitations on the state in imposing an economic disincentive tax as
a form of limited entry. First, valuations for taxation must have a just
relation to the real value of the property assessed, and there must be no
substantial inequality in valuations of the various kinds of property
subject to the tax." Second, only the present value of property, not its
anticipated value, may be used for purposes of valuation. 4
C. Legal Impediments to Limited Entnj in Alabama
Alabama has used two kinds of limited entry: One has been a
form of ITQs, while the other has been an economic disincentive plan.
The ITQ plan differs somewhat from the usual model. Alabama charges
gradually increasing license fees as the harvesting capacity of a vessel
increases. 141 Consequently, with other ITQ systems, the efficiency goals
of limited entry are furthered by allowing a fisherman to make an
economic decision about how much he wishes to invest in a harvest
before he enters a fishery. The economic disincentive plan the state has
enacted is simply an increase in license fees." In 1988, the first year
that higher fees were assessed, the number of licenses issued decreased
by 60 percent.'" The number of licenses granted has varied since then,
but the current number is still less than half of the licenses issued in
1988.15
At present, no further forms of limitation are being consid46
ered.1
Currently, the policy in Alabama is to "enforce and administer all
laws providing for the preservation, protection, and propagation and
development of... saltwater fish, shrimp, oysters, crustaceans, and other

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Fla. Const. art. IX, § 14(a) (1885).
L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Federal Landmark Bank, 150 So. 248, 250 (Fla. 1933).
Graham v. City of Tampa, 71 So. 926, 927 (Fla. 1916).
1967 Op. Atty. Gen. 067-51 (Fla. 1967).
See supra note 118.
Id.
See supra note 118 (response from Walter M. Tatum).
Id.
Id.
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shellfish ... within the state... which have not been reduced to private
ownership." 147 The phrase that stands out is the one regarding private
ownership. The wording of the statute could cause problems should a
court determine that fishermen have a property right in uncaught fish.
The word "preservation" was recently added to the statute. This change
can probably be ascribed to increased awareness of environmental
concerns, although in fact the change is of but slight effect. As is the case
in Florida, the policy mentions nothing of economic factors. If Alabama
wishes to avoid litigation, the statute should probably be amended to
include language about promoting economic efficiency as a goal of
fishery management.
The Alabama Constitution adds very few additional obstacles to
the implementation of a limited entry scheme not already imposed by the
federal constitution. The Alabama supreme court has held that the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution essentially
mirror Art I §1 and Art I §13 of the Alabama Constitution (the due
process and equal protection provisions)." Since limited entry programs are already operating in many federal waters, 49 any obstacles
imposed by the federal constitution under equal protection or due
process would likely be identical to those erected by the Alabama
constitution under the same provisions.
Although the right to pursue ordinary occupations is a fundamental and inalienable right, it is subject to the paramount exercise of the
state's police power."5' Alabama declares that it has the right to exercise
its police power in order to preserve life, liberty, and property against the
encroachments of mere arbitrary power.' The state also has the right,
by exercising its police power in the interest of the general welfare, to
change rules of common law, even though such changes may deprive a
citizen of a claim for personal or property damage. 2 Assuming there
is a common law right to. fish the open seas, and assuming a limited
entry program would exclude, or at least restrict a fisherman's access to
the seas, a fisherman could formulate a plausible argument that he had
a property right in the fish. Alabama, under its police power, would have

147. Ala. Code § 9-2-7(a) (repl. Vol. 1975).
148. Jefferson County v. Braswell, 407 So.2d 115, 122 (Ala. 1981).
149. Alantic Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog Fisheries Plan 50 C.F.R. § 652 (1991); Atlantic
Billfishes Plan, 50 C.F.R. § 644 (1991); and Atlantic Mackerel, Squid, and Butterfish Fisheries
Plan, 50 C.F.R. § 655 (1991) (these are all limited entry plans initiated by marine fisheries
councils established by Magnuson Act).
150. State v. Polakow's Realty Experts, 10 So. 2d 461, 462 (Ala. 1942).
151. Edwards v. Bibb County Bd. of Com'rs, 69 So. 449, 450 (Ala. 1915).
152. Pickett v. Matthews, 192 So. 261, 265 (Ala. 1939). Common law holds that all citizens
have a common property right to fish in his country's territorial sea. See Pearse, supra note
1, at 72.
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no legal obstacle to depriving that fisherman of his right for the purpose
of promoting the general welfare. The primary restriction that limits
Alabama's power to institute a limited entry scheme under its police
power is that any classifications within the scheme must have a rational
basis in relation to the desired objectives,"s
D. Legal Impediments to Limited Entrj in Mississippi
Mississippi has only instituted a minor form of limited entry. The
state's limited entry is a modified license limitation program that requires
anyone desiring a live-bait shrimp license to submit an application
between January 1 and April 30.'54 Requests filed after this date are not
considered. Mississippi's license program differs from typical license
limitation in restricting licenses by time rather than by number. In effect,
this system amounts to little more than an administrative device to
manage the license application program. Mississippi has acknowledged
that this restriction has had no noticeable effect in reducing the number
of live-bait shrimpers."5 No other limited entry schemes are currently
under consideration.lss
Mississippi states that its policy:
"shall be to recognize the need for a concerted effort to work
towards the protection, propagation and conservation of its
seafood and aquatic life in connection with the revitalization
of the seafood industry ...which is one of the state's major
economic resources and affords a livelihood to thousands of
its citizens; and in this connection, it is the intent of the
legislature to provide a modern, sound, comprehensive, and
workable law to be administered by specialists ... it being
remembered at all times that all of the wild aquatic life found
in the waters of the State of Mississippi and on the bottoms of
such waters, until taken therefrom in the manner hereinafter
prescribed, is recognized as the property of the State of
Mississippi because of its very nature, as well as because of
the great value of the state of the aquatic life for food and
other necessary purposes." 57

153. State v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 471 So. 2d 408, 412 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) appeal
dismissed, 474 U.S. 936 (1985).
154. Mississippi Bureau of Marine Resources, 1992 Mississippi Guide to Saltwater Fishing
Regulations, 11 (1992).
155. Survey, supra note 118 (response from Eric Van de Vender).
156. Id. ,
157. Miss. Code Ann. § 49-15-1 (1972).
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The first phrase of note is the one where the state declares that it owns
the fish. It would be a good phrase for any state considering limited
entry to include in its policy statute because it mentions both economic
and biological concerns. However, whether or not economic concerns
would be served by limited entry is questionable. Some might argue that
limited entry might make the fisheries a viable economic avenue to
pursue for those allowed to fish, while others might assert that the
exclusion of fishermen does nothing to revitalize the persons involved in
the seafood industry.
Mississippi has few serious legal obstacles to the implementation
of a limited entry program. The constitution of Mississippi has no equal
protection provision, therefore, any equal protection claim would have to
be based solely on the fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The state constitution does, however, contain a due process clause
providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." The Mississippi legislature enjoys wide
latitude in making laws based upon classification of persons, and those
laws will not be invalidated under the due process or equal protection
This
clauses unless they are manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable.
broad test evidences the Mississippi Supreme Court's desire to give the
legislature as much leeway as constitutionally permissible. Thus if a
classification in a limited entry scheme bore any resemblance to the
purported objective, it would pass muster under the standard set by the
court.
The legislature, in addition to having broad powers in deciding
how to regulate definable groups, has virtual plenary power in deciding
which groups to regulate, so long as they are treated as classes."
Under its police power, the legislature may adopt any statutes necessary
for the general welfare and convenience of the public."" On the subject
of fishing, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that, by virtue of its
police power, the state has the right to regulate the time, manner, and
extent of the taking of fish in running streams and lakes with outlets into
other waters." The troublesome language is "streams and lakes." The
language can be viewed as a limitation intended by the court to limit the
scope of its decision so as to exclude marine resources. A reading of the
case law, however, makes it clear that this is not the proper interpretation. The Fritz court held that statutes regulating and restricting the
capture of creatures ferae naturae [wild animals], not reduced to actual

158.
159.
160.
161.

Miss. Const. art. III, § 14.
Mississippi Bd. of Nursing v. Belk, 481 So. 2d 826, 830 (Miss. 1985).
Peterson v. Sandoz, 451 So. 2d 216, 218-19 (Miss. 1984).
State v. Armstead, 60 So. 778, 779 (Miss. 1913).

162. Ex parte Fritz, 38 So. 722, 723 (Miss. 1905).
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possession, is a valid exercise of the state's police power and is not
violative of the fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, or §17 of
the Mississippi Constitution, which requires just compensation for the
taking of private property." 3 This statement removes any doubt as to
whether or not the Mississippi constitution presents any impediments to
a limited entry program with regard to the issue of "takings."
Mississippi's limited entry program options are broadened by a
taxation provision in the state constitution. Section 112 states that all
property is subject to ad valorem taxation unless otherwise exempted.'"
At first glance, this provision would only seem to apply to real property,
but subsequent case history would belie this view. Though captured wild
animals have never been taxed, domestic animals have been.'" While
this is not dispositive of the issue of whether or not a tax on landed fish
would be valid under this section, it does not seem to be a great leap of
logic that if a tax on domestic animals is valid, a tax on seized wild
animals would be valid as well. The only limitation on this mode of
taxation beyond equal protection and due process concerns is that the
rate of taxation for this type of property is limited to 15 percent of its true
value.' 6 Whether or not this rate is high enough to constitute an
effective economic disincentive tax remains to be seen.
E. Legal Impediments to Limited Entry in Louisiana
No limited entry program has yet been implemented in Louisiana." 7 In 1990 a bill was introduced in the state's legislature, 1" which
if enacted, would have implemented the boldest limited entry plan ever
attempted on the Gulf Coast. ' The terms of the plan are very similar
to those of Alaska's. It provides a license limitation system whereby
licenses are issued only to fishermen previously licensed in the fishery."7 It would further require anyone who wished to enter a fishery
after the date of enactment to prove that 25 percent of his yearly income
(50 percent after 1993)' came from harvesting that fishery."r The bill

163. Id. at 723.
164. Miss. Const. art IV, § 112.
165. State v.Widman, 72 So. 782, 783-84 (Miss. 1916). The state imposed a $1.00 per male
dog and the $3.00 per female dog tax on the owners of such animals. Id. The state's
philosophy was that dogs were destructive to livestock and property, and by applying a tax,
the owners' of the dogs would refrain from propagating the species. Id.
166. Miss Const. art. IV, § 112.
167. Survey, supra note 118 (Response from John Russell).
168. H.R. 1648, Reg. Sess., La. (1990).
169. Christopher Cooper, Linited Entry for Lousiana?, National Fisherman, 26 (Oct. 1990).
170. H.R. 1648, Reg. Sess., La. § 394(F) (1990).
171. Id. at § 304(H)(1).
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was defeated, and there are at present no plans to reintroduce it."r The
policy statute of Louisiana reads:
[riecognizing the value of the seafood industry to the economy
of the state, recognizing that the seafood industry employs
hundreds of Louisiana citizens, thereby decreasing unemployment and the burden unemployment places on the state fish,
and further recognizing that the commercial fishing industry
is in danger of collapsing as an industry ... it is the policy
and purpose of this subpart to provide every method of
encouragement and assistance to the commercial fisherman of
this state, to protect a culture and heritage that is unique to
Louisiana, to prevent unemployment of Louisiana citizens, to
assure adequate food for Louisiana citizens, and to provide for
economic stability in those areas of Louisiana so dependent on
the seafood industry."
Louisiana's fishery policy statement is unlike those of the other states in
that it looks only to economic concerns and does not include ecological
considerations. Additionally, the policy specifically states that the fishing
industry is to be used as a means to prevent unemployment." Limited
entry by its nature will cause some fishermen to lose their jobs. For a
limited entry program to be sustained in Louisiana, its stated policy will
have to be substantially amended.
Louisiana has little in its constitution that would impede a
limited entry system. The state's equal protection clause simply says that
no person shall be denied equal protection of the laws and that there can
be no discrimination based on race, religious beliefs, affiliations, birth,
age, sex, physical condition, or political ideas. 76 Fishermen per se do not
fall into one of these categories. As long as legislation avoided classification based on any of these areas, there should not be a problem with
equal protection. Louisiana, like Florida, has used its police power in
conjunction with equal protection to assume broad powers to regulate
businesses that affect the public interest." In the exercise of its police
power and in the interest of the public, the state may, without denial of
equal protection of the laws, reasonably regulate a business affected with
a public interest, or a useful trade, occupation, or profession that may
prove injurious to the public.' Furthermore, within proper limitations
172. Id. at § 304(G)(1).
173. Survey, supra note 120 (response from John Russell).
174. La. Rev. Stat. Ann, § 56:571 (West 1986).
175. Id.

176. La. Const. art. I § 3.
177. City of Alexandria v. Breard, 47 So. 2d 553,555 (La. 1950), aff'd 341 U.S. 622 (1950).
178. Id.
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the legislature may, without denying equal protection, classify businesses
and occupations and provide different rules for different classes, and may
limit a regulation to a certain kind of business. It may also extend to
some persons privileges denied to others or impose restrictions on some
but not others, where the classification or discrimination is based on real
differences in the subject matter, is reasonable, and affects alike all
persons pursuing the same business under the same conditions." The
preceding statements adequately illustrate the state's power to regulate
differences in business as long as the differences are reasonable. Given
such a broad standard, if a proposed limited entry scheme was not
violative of federal equal protection, then it would undoubtedly not be
violative of state equal protection.
Louisiana's due process clause provides that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. " 8°
"
The state uses its police power to regulate business under due process as
well as equal protection.' The standard the Louisiana supreme court
has set down for business and occupation regulation under its police
power is that the regulation must bear a real and substantial relationship
to the goal (public welfare)." This standard seems to be nothing more
than a rewording of the federally mandated "rational basis" test.
Therefore, passing muster under the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution would likely mean passing muster at the state level.
One provision of the state constitution that might provide an
obstruction to a limited entry system would be the environmental public
policy section. Louisiana's environmental policy states that, "the natural
resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic,
historic, and aesthetic quality of the environment shall be protected,
conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the
health, safety, and welfare of the people."" Environmental protection,
however, is not the exclusive goal. It requires a balancing test in which
environmental costs and benefits must be given full and careful consideration along with economic, social, and other factors."
Although there is no specific ad valorem on personal property
taxation section in the Louisiana constitution, economic disincentives are
allowed under its due process provision."5 The Louisiana court has
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held that the state has the right to charge economic disincentives to
discourage participation in a particular business under its police
power. 8 ' As with other actions taken under the police power, the
disincentive must bear a substantial relationship to the goal. 87
F. Legal Impediments to Limited Entry in Texas
Texas' efforts to install a limited entry program have consisted of
placing moratoria on the issuance of licenses. In 1981 and 1982 a
moratorium was instituted for bay and bait shrimp vessels, but it has
Currently, there is a moratorium on bay bottom
since been lifted."
oyster licenses.'" Its specific effects are unknown. The environmental
affairs committee of the Texas House of Representatives is presently
conducting a study on the potential effects of limited entry on the bait
shrimp fisheries.'" Their report is to be completed prior to the commencement of the 1993 legislative session, and it is expected that some
limited entry plan will be submitted for consideration within the
type of
91
year.1
Unlike the other Gulf states, Texas does not have a single general
fishery management policy statute. The Texas wildlife code is so detailed
that each different form of aquatic life has its own chapter. For example,
the factors that the Texas Wildlife Commission must take into account
when promulgating rules and regulations for the shrimp fisheries are as
follows. The commission shall conduct continuous research and study of:
1) the supply, economic value, environment, and reproductive characteristics of the various species of shrimp; 2) factors affecting the increase or
decrease of shrimp; 3) the use of trawls, nets, and other devices for the
taking of shrimp; 4) industrial and other pollution of the water naturally
frequented by shrimp; and 5) statistical information gathered by the
department on the marketing, harvesting, processing, and catching of
shrimp landed in the state. 92 The above-enumerated factors take both
economic and biological concerns into account, likely assuring that it
would withstand a limited entry challenge.
The Texas Wildlife Commission's list of factors for consideration
when promulgating rules for shrimp fisheries did not take effect until 1
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September 1991.1'" The factors that were determinative until this date
included a provision that lists "alternative management measures for
shrimp." " ' The exclusion of this factor seem to indicate the Texas
legislature's interest in limited entry has been shelved for the moment.
Texas has some constitutional provisions that may make the
implementation of a limited entry system more difficult. This fact is
somewhat ironic because its moratorium on the issuance of shrimping
licenses in the early 1980s was the first attempt at any form of limited
entry by a Gulf Coast state. 9'
The equal protection provision in Texas has little illuminating
language. It simply states that "faIll freemen, when they form a social
compact, have equal rights.""* The police power of Texas extends to
any matter that affects public health, morals, or welfare. 97 Where the
state may under its police power require a license to participate in some
activity, the state may make such classifications, restrictions, and
prohibitions deemed necessary, so long as they do not violate constitutional guarantees" The test is whether or not there is any basis for the
classification which could have seemed reasonable to the legislature.'"
A classification is reasonable if it is based on a real and substantial
difference and operates equally on all in the same class.' The test that
Texas uses is in effect the same standard used in fourteenth amendment
equal protection claims. Therefore, it can be assumed that if a limited
entry system could survive fourteenth amendment scrutiny, it would
meet the requirements of equal protection in Texas.
The "takings" provision states, "no person's property shall be
taken, damaged, or destroyed or applied to public use without adequate
compensation being made."" Though this is in essence an eminent
domain statute, it also requires compensation where the reduction in
value is caused by an exercise of the state's police power.202 The Texas
courts define personal property as property gained from ownership,
possession, and an unrestricted right to use, enjoy, and dispose.3
Fishermen have no possessory rights in free-swimming seafood. Chapters
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App. 1974).
199. Railroad Comm. of Texas v. Miller, 434 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tex. 1968).
200. Id. at 673.
201. Tex. Const. art. I § 17.
202. City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978).
203. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 514-15 (Tex. 1921).
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of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Code (effective until Sept. 1, 1991) list the
restrictions on an individuals right to use, enjoy, and dispose of fish.'
Thus, implementing a limited entry scheme would not require the state
to compensate excluded fishermen. Whether or not these provisions
would require compensation after a program was installed and persons
were deprived of the right to fish will depend on the wording of the
program.
The due process clause in the Texas constitution is different from
the other states. It has the requisite language about life, liberty, and
property, but it also notes that privileges or immunities cannot be
deprived without due process of law.' The Texas courts use the same
"mirror image" approach as does Alabama.' Therefore, the Texas
courts hold consistently with the federal courts in that an individual
cannot be deprived of a license or permit without due process or
notice.? But the state courts have held that licenses to drive motor
vehicles and to practice law are privileges, hence the right to due process
upon revocation can be legislatively altered under -the state's police
power, as long as it is reasonable.' Since fishing licenses are generally
revocable at the will of the state without notice,' the due process that
must be accorded a pre-existing license holder should he be excluded
from a fishery is uncertain. The requisite due process for deprivation of
life, liberty, or property is higher than that which is required for the
deprivation of a privilege or immunity. The question remains to what
extent would due process have to be accorded should a limited entry
program be implemented in Texas. The answer will hinge on whether or
not a property right is granted by the system implemented. The final
section of the Texas constitution that may prevent limited entry legislation is its state-granted monopolies provision, which says, "[plerpetuities
and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government, and
shall never be allowed." 2 ' A monopoly forbidden by this section in a
sense consists of the ownership or control of so large a part of the market
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supply of a given commodity as to stifle competition, restrict the freedom
of commerce, and give the monopolies control over prices.21' The
manner in which these monopolies are created is immaterial if in fact a
monopoly is thereby created.2" Therefore, if the manner Texas selected
to initiate a limited entry program created a system whereby a small
number held the majority of the access to the fishery, the state courts
would likely strike down the program as violative of this constitutional
provision.
In Texas no ad valorem taxation may be levied on tangible
personal property.2 13 Consequently, a tax disincentive would not be
available as a tool for drafters of a limited entry program in Texas.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Limited entry fishing regulations, as a substantive marine policy,
will run into obstacles on two levels. First, there are the legal ramifications of the nature of the scheme enacted. Second, is the difficulty of
striking a delicate balance between implementing a constitutionally sound
program while still achieving the objectives of the plan. Two legal issues
come to the forefront in discussing limited entry: whether or not the
manner of distributing entry into the fisheries will conform to fourteenth
amendment equal protection, and whether or not granting entry to the
fishery will create a property right in those granted access.
A challenge to a state's entry distribution based on equal
protection would seem to be the most likely method of attack on a
limited entry program. However, given the standards the states must
adhere to, careful planning and wording of the legislation should render
such a claim unsuccessful. The property right issue is more uncertain.
Although the federal courts have never held that fishermen have a
property right in maintaining access to the ocean, there is nothing
preventing the states from declaring one.
Transferability of licenses also poses a number of problems.
Somewhere between free transferability and no transferability is a level
that would make a limited entry scheme most effective. Whether or not
this level would coincide with legally allowable standards depends on
the individual court.
For the most part, the problems a limited entry scheme would
face on a federal constitutional level would also be addressed at the state
level. Between the use of a "mirror image" philosophy and comparable
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wording of the essential state constitutional provisions, it is unlikely any
equal protection, due process, or just compensation claim to overturn a
limited entry program would prevail in a state court while failing in a
federal court.
State law differs from federal law most dramatically in the
breadth of the police power and the states' right to employ economic
disincentives in the form of taxes. Taxation can be used to limit entry to
fisheries in all the Gulf states except Texas. Whether or not it would be
effective is uncertain, and the use of such a system would be politically
dangerous. Police power is the state's strongest weapon. Each Gulf state
has used this power in some fashion to regulate its fishing industry with
the states typically declaring that they are doing so in the interest of the
general welfare. The standard to overcome police power legislation is
"arbitrary and capricious." The likelihood of invalidating a limited entry
system based on the assumption that the state lacked the power to do so,
or that the nature of the system was not sound, is slim.
A state's power to enact limited entry is clear. The main obstacle
in enacting a limited entry policy is the rights that are benignly granted
to the access holder. Such policies are workable at the state level, as has
been evidenced by Alaska's system. However, Alaska's scheme saw
numerous legislative and court battles before it became firmly established. Any Gulf state considering limited entry should look, therefore,
very carefully at all the pertinent laws and regulations that may affect
access limitation in order to ensure a smooth implementation and to
avoid litigation.

